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BAD MEDICINE: FTC v. ACTAVIS, INC. AND THE MISSED
OPPORTUNITY TO RESOLVE THE PAY-FOR-DELAY PROBLEM
SUSAN SCHIPPER ∗
In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 1 the Supreme Court of
the United States considered whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit correctly dismissed the Federal Trade Commission’s
(“FTC”) antitrust challenge to a reverse payment settlement agreement 2 between brand-name and generic drug manufacturers, 3 in the context of patent
litigation, for the hormone medication AndroGel. 4 This type of settlement
is colloquially referred to as a “pay-for-delay” arrangement. 5 The Court
Copyright © 2014 by Susan Schipper.
∗
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1. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
2. Id. at 2227. Briefly, a reverse payment settlement is a settlement wherein a brand-name
drug company pays a potentially competitive generic drug company to defer putting its approved
generic version of the brand-name’s drug on the market for a certain period of time. See infra
Parts I and II.A (elaborating upon the concept and details of reverse payment settlements). This
agreement takes place within litigation where the brand-name, as the plaintiff, sues the generic for
infringement on the brand-name’s patented drug. Id. The reverse payment settlement is so called
because a plaintiff paying a defendant in settlement is the reverse of a typical litigation outcome.
Id.
3. Companies that test, produce, and obtain patents for new drugs or drug composites that
are filed and sold under a trade name, such as Tylenol, are known as brand-name companies.
Companies that obtain a patent to market generic, bioequivalent versions of brand-name drugs
under the name of the active ingredient(s) of the drug, or under a different name than the brandname, are known as generic companies. See What are Generic Drugs?, FDA.GOV (May 12,
2009),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/Understan
dingGenericDrugs/ucm144456.htm; see also, e.g., List of Marketed Acetaminophen-Containing
Prescription
Products,
FDA.GOV
(Jan.
21,
2011),
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/informationbydrugclass/ucm239821.htm#list (listing in a
chart the “brand name” and “generic name” of certain types of prescription medications containing acetaminophen). This Note will hereinafter refer to brand-name drug companies as either
“brand-names” or “brand-name companies,” and will refer to generic drug companies as “generics” or “generic companies.”
4. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229–30; FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th
Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
5. See, e.g., Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1301 (“This case involves a type of patent
litigation settlement known as a ‘pay for delay’ or ‘reverse payment’ agreement.”); Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 F.3d 779, 780 (2d Cir. 2010) (“In the industry par-
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held that the Eleventh Circuit erred in failing to allow the FTC to challenge
the legality of the settlement, where a brand-name pharmaceutical company, Solvay Pharmaceuticals, agreed to pay the named generic, Actavis, Inc.,
and other generic drug companies, hundreds of millions of dollars to refrain
from marketing a generic version of AndroGel until 2015. 6 The FTC alleged in its complaint against the settling drug companies that the reverse
payment component of their settlement was a collusive, horizontal restraint
on trade and was therefore a violation of antitrust law. 7 The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the FTC’s challenge and held that the monopoly powers conferred to pharmaceutical patent-holders precluded the FTC from bringing an
antitrust action against the parties engaging in pay-for-delay as long as the
anti-competitive effects of the pay-for-delay do not exceed the scope of the
patent’s monopoly. 8 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding instead that
reverse payment settlements are not impervious to antitrust challenges and
can be decided using a traditional antitrust framework. 9
The Court was correct in holding that antitrust challenges to pay-fordelay arrangements are indeed justiciable and that questions surrounding
the legality of the settlements should be decided against an antitrust framework. 10 Ultimately, though, the Court failed to embrace one of the competing standards that lower federal courts have used when applying antitrust
principles to reverse payment settlements in the pharmaceutical context.11
The Court should have adopted the rigorous “quick look rule of reason”
analysis as the definitive standard for adjudging reverse payment agreements. 12 As a matter of policy, the Court should have also recommended
that reverse payment settlements be subject to judicial approval to ensure
that they do not exceed the anticipated costs of litigation.13 This recommendation would likely limit the number of patent challenges that are settled using a reverse payment model, thereby decreasing the risk of antitrust
violations. 14 Further, it would strike a balance between allowing early mar-

lance, [a reverse payment settlement] is called a ‘reverse exclusion payment,’ or, more evocatively, a ‘pay-for-delay settlement.’”). This Note will hereinafter refer to reverse payment settlements
either as “reverse payment settlements” or “pay-for-delay arrangements.”
6. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227, 2229.
7. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1305.
8. Id. at 1312.
9. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227, 2237–38.
10. See infra Part IV.A.
11. See infra Parts II.B and IV.B.1.
12. See infra Part IV.B.2.
13. See infra Part IV.C.
14. See infra Part IV.C.
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ket entry for generic companies while ensuring that brand-name companies
continue to receive the patent protections afforded to them. 15
I. THE CASE
Belgian pharmaceutical company Besins Healthcare, S.A. (“Besins”)
developed a formula for a prescription gel used to treat male hypogonadism, a condition where the body does not produce normal levels of testosterone; the company called this new drug “AndroGel.” 16 In August 1995,
Besins entered into an agreement with another brand-name drug manufacturer, Solvay Pharmaceuticals (“Solvay”), to supply Solvay with AndroGel
once Solvay received government approval to sell the drug in the United
States. 17 In 1999, Solvay filed a New Drug Application (“NDA”) 18 with the
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to market AndroGel, which the
FDA approved in 2000. 19 Solvay subsequently obtained a relevant patent
from the Patent and Trademark Office to sell AndroGel in 2003, and disclosed its patent to the FDA. 20 Solvay’s patent for AndroGel, Patent Number 6,503,894 (“#894 patent”), expires in 2020. 21 According to the HatchWaxman Act, a main governing body of law for the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry, the FDA must grant a drug manufacturer three years of drug exclusivity for a new drug application containing an active ingredient that has
already been approved by the FDA, but which still includes important clinical investigations. 22 The FDA is only authorized to approve generic versions of a brand-name drug once the brand-name’s exclusivity period is
over. 23 Since Solvay’s NDA contained crucial clinical investigations regarding the active ingredients in AndroGel, the FDA granted the company
exclusivity for the drug for three years. 24 AndroGel is a profitable drug; between 2000 and 2007, U.S. sales of AndroGel totaled more than $1.8 billion. 25

15. See infra Part IV.C.
16. In re AndroGel Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1372–73 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
17. Id. at 1373.
18. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)(b) (2012) (explaining the Hatch-Waxman Act’s requirements
and process for a New Drug Application); see also infra Part II.A (elaborating on the NDA requirements).
19. In re Androgel, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1373.
20. Id.; see infra Part II.A (explaining the requirements and process for filing an Abbreviated
New Drug Application).
21. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1304 (2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
22. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii).
23. Id.
24. In re Androgel, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1373.
25. Id.
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While brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers must undertake extensive drug testing before their NDAs can be approved, manufacturers applying to market generic versions of already-existing drugs do not need to
file rigorous NDAs, and instead can file less costly and time-consuming applications called Abbreviated New Drug Applications (“ANDAs”).26 Within their ANDAs, generics assert that the version of the drug they seek to
market is the biological equivalent of an already-FDA-approved medication. 27 It is also incumbent on generic manufacturers to certify that their
generic drug, despite its bioequivalency, will not infringe on the brandname’s patent for the drug. 28 In late 2003, Actavis, Inc. (formerly named
Watson Pharmaceuticals 29 and referred to hereinafter as “Actavis”), a generic drug manufacturer, filed an ANDA with the FDA to market a generic
version of AndroGel. 30 In its application, Actavis certified that despite its
bioequivalency to AndroGel, its generic version of the drug would not infringe on Solvay’s patent because Solvay’s patent was overly broad and
thereby invalid. 31 Following Actavis’s ANDA submission, another generic
manufacturer, Paddock Laboratories, Inc. (“Paddock”), also filed an ANDA
to market a generic version of AndroGel. 32 Consequently, Solvay filed a
patent infringement suit against both Actavis and Paddock. 33 Solvay’s infringement action triggered the requisite thirty-month waiting period before
the FDA could approve Actavis’s application. 34
From 2003 to 2005, Solvay, Actavis, and Paddock engaged in litigation regarding the #894 AndroGel patent; following discovery, the generics
filed motions for summary judgment on the patent’s (in)validity. 35 The motions were “fully briefed and ready for decision” in January 2006 when the
26. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j); see infra Part II.A (discussing the ANDA process stipulated by the
Hatch-Waxman Act). An ANDA is a speedier route for patent approval available to generic drug
manufacturers, allowing them to apply for market approval from the FDA for a new, generic version of an already existing drug without conducting extensive testing when a brand-name manufacturer has already gone through the testing and received FDA approval to market its biologically
similar medicine. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
27. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1302 (2012) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(a)
(2012)), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
28. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vi).
29. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (“Actavis, Inc. (then known as Watson Pharmaceuticals), filed
an Abbreviated New Drug Application for a generic drug modeled after AndroGel.”).
30. Watson Pharm. Inc., 677 F.3d at 1304.
31. Id.
32. Id. Notably, as the second generic to file an ANDA, Paddock could not enjoy the same
180-day period of exclusivity that Actavis would receive as the first filer. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.; see also infra Part II.A. Hatch-Waxman requires the FDA to wait thirty months before approving an ANDA when the generic filing the ANDA is involved in paragraph IV litigation. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355 (j)(5)(A)–(B) (2012).
35. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1304.
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FDA approved Actavis’s ANDA to market its generic version of AndroGel. 36 Recognizing that it would lose its exclusivity to market AndroGel if
the court granted the generics’ summary judgment motion, which could
lead to a subsequent reduction of $125 million per year in profit, Solvay offered Actavis a hefty settlement. 37 As part of the settlement, Actavis agreed
to delay the entry of its generic into the market until August 2015; other generic manufacturers, including Paddock, made similar deals with Solvay. 38
In exchange for their delayed entry, Solvay agreed to give Actavis between
$19 and $30 million of its AndroGel profits per year until September 2015,
and to pay Paddock $10 million per year for six years.39
Solvay asserted that its proposed payments were compensation for
“other services” that the generics agreed to perform, but the FTC countered
that the payments were made to compensate the generics for agreeing not to
compete against AndroGel until 2015. 40 The FTC filed suit in 2010 against
all of the settling parties—Solvay, Actavis, Paddock, and another generic
manufacturer, Par Pharmaceutical Companies, Inc.—in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia.41 The FTC’s complaint asserted
that the respondents violated several federal antitrust laws by unlawfully
agreeing to share in Solvay’s monopoly profits, abandon their patent challenges, and refrain from launching their low-cost generic products to compete with AndroGel for nine years.42
The district court dismissed the case, holding that the FTC’s allegations dealt in the patent arena, and thus did not properly invoke antitrust
law. 43 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, reasoning that “absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent,
a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long as its
anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of
the patent.” 44 Although the appellate court acknowledged that antitrust violations often occur when one company pays another company to stay out of
a particular market, the court also noted that reverse payment settlements of
patent litigation present “atypical cases” because patent holders have an inherent legal right to exclude others from the market. 45 By its very nature,

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 1304–05.
Id. at 1305.
Id.
Id.
In re AndroGel Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1375–76 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 1380.
Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1312.
Id. at 1307.
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the court reasoned, “a patent conveys the right to ‘cripple competition.’”46
Citing the need to resolve the competing standards used by different federal
courts in adjudging antitrust challenges to reverse payment settlements, the
Supreme Court granted the FTC’s petition for certiorari. 47
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
and its 2003 amendments, 48 commonly and collectively known as the
Hatch-Waxman Act (“Hatch-Waxman” or “the Act”), regulates patent application and market approval for both brand-name and generic drug companies, 49 but contains no provision that specifically governs the applicability of antitrust law to patent litigation.50 As such, for over ten years before
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., antitrustreverse payment settlement disputes had been subject to various standards
and levels of scrutiny in several different federal circuits.51 Reverse payment settlement jurisprudence was therefore largely unpredictable: federal
courts identified the same stubborn legal issues inherent in charging a patent-related action—which is essentially a government-sanctioned monopoly—with violating government-established anti-monopoly principles, but
came to different conclusions to resolve the tension and followed no overarching formula. 52
Part II.A of this Note explores the relevant provisions of HatchWaxman that govern the patent filing process for both brand-name and generic drug companies and outlines the course of events within these filings
that lead to paragraph IV litigation.53 Part II.B highlights the three disparate standards that federal courts have used in resolving reverse payment settlement challenges in the context of pharmaceutical litigation.

46. Id. at 1309 (quoting Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir.
2005)).
47. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013).
48. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).
49. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1), (j)(2)(A)(vii); see also infra Part II.A.
50. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (“[D]ifferent courts have reached different conclusions
about the application of the antitrust laws to Hatch-Waxman-related patent settlements.”).
51. See infra Part II.C (discussing how the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third,
Sixth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have used different standards to resolve antitrust challenges
to pay-for-delay arrangements).
52. See infra Part II.C (discussing competing interests that several circuits have weighed
when considering antitrust challenges to reverse payment settlements, such as the interest in preserving judicial preferences for settlement and the interest in ensuring that a settlement provision
does not go beyond the scope of a patent-holder’s rightly held monopoly on a particular drug).
53. See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
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A. Filing Requirements for Both Brand-Name and Generic
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Mandated by the Hatch-Waxman
Act Provide a Mechanism for Paragraph IV Litigation and Reverse
Payment Settlements
The 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to reframe drug patent approval laws in the United States to allow generic equivalents of patented
brand-name drugs to gain expedited market approval and lower drug prices
for consumers, while still providing adequate patent protections and incentives for brand-name manufacturers to continue to develop new drugs. 54
Prior to the passage of the Act, there was a large gap between the time that
a patent expired on a brand-name drug and the time that a generic manufacturer was eligible to market its own version of the drug. 55 This delay ensued largely because, prior to the enactment of Hatch-Waxman, generic
manufacturers were required to conduct full testing to prove the safety and
efficacy of their drugs (even if the drugs were exact copies of a brandname’s drug), and they were not allowed to use the brand-name’s data or
drug as a template for their own testing. 56 With this required expensive
testing, 57 it took generic manufacturers approximately three years after
brand-name patent expiration to bring their generic drugs to market. 58 In
54. See 130 CONG. REC. 24,430 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman)
(“The public will benefit twice; by the further incentive for research and development for new,
innovative drugs and by the immediate reduction in drug prices when a generic is on the market as
a competitor.”); see also Ian Jaquette, Comment, Merck KGAA v. Integra Life Sciences I, Ltd.:
Implications of the Supreme Court’s Decision for the People Who Matter Most . . . the Consumer,
33 AM. J.L. & MED. 97, 101–02 (2007) (“Title I of the Act created an abbreviated new drug application process designed to expedite the arrival of generic drugs . . . . Congress enacted Title II of
the Hatch-Waxman Act as a means of mitigating the distortion to the [brand-name’s] patent
term.”).
55. H. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984).
56. Id.; see also Jeff Thomas, Schering-Plough and In re Tamoxifen: Lawful Reverse Payments in the Hatch-Waxman Context, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 13, 18 (2007) (“Prior to passage of
the [Hatch-Waxman Act] Amendments [to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act], generic manufacturers were required to wait for the branded drug patent to expire before beginning development
work on the patented product.”); Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman
Act by Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS
L.J. 171, 174–75 (2008) (“Generic manufacturers could not use the NDA holder’s data to demonstrate safety and efficacy, and were forced to conduct their own clinical trials.”).
57. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY
15
(2006),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-drugr-d.pdf (finding
that the development of new drugs take, on average, ten to fifteen years); see also Bret Dickey,
Jonathan Orszag & Laura Tyson, An Economic Assessment of Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367, 369 (2010) (estimating that a new drug takes ten to
fifteen years to develop and costs more than $1.3 billion).
58. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 38 (1998) [hereinafter
INCREASED
COMPETITION
FROM
GENERIC
DRUGS],
available
at
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contrast, since Hatch-Waxman’s enactment and the creation of the ANDA
system, the typical timespan between brand-name patent expiration and generic drug entry is between one and three months.59 Therefore, Senator
Hatch and Representative Waxman sponsored the Act to strike a balance
between extending patent terms to promote innovation in the pharmaceutical industry and incentivizing generic companies to introduce low-cost versions of drugs into the market more quickly. 60
Under the Act, brand-name drug manufacturers filing for new patents
are required to submit an NDA to the FDA when seeking to market a new
drug formula. 61 The brand-name must still undertake the extensive—and
expensive—health and safety testing that has always been required before
the FDA will approve a drug for marketing. 62 To encourage new drug development, however, the Act also extended brand-name companies’ patent
terms to make up for the time that brand-names’ patents are stuck in the
FDA approval process. 63 Once a drug is approved for marketing, the relevant patent is entered in an annual FDA publication, Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, also known as the “Orange
Book.” 64 Conversely, Hatch-Waxman allows generic manufacturers to

http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf; see also Henry
Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 491, 492 (2007).
59. INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 58, at 38–39.
60. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 98th Cong. 1 (1984) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res.) (“On one hand, lower drug prices—tens of millions of dollars a year in total savings—will flow from increased generic competition made possible by a new abbreviated new drug application . . . for off-patent drugs approved after 1962.”); see
also Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l., 256 F.3d 799, 801–02 (2001) (“In 1984 the Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (Amendments) to, inter alia, simplify the procedure for FDA approval. . . . Although the Congress was
interested in increasing the availability of generic drugs, it also wanted to protect the patent rights
of the pioneer applicants.”); Grabowski & Kyle, supra note 58, at 492 (“[T]he Hatch-Waxman Act
provided for partial restoration of the patent time lost during the [brand-name manufacturer’s]
regulatory review and clinical testing period [when the brand-name’s patent time begins running
even before the patent is approved].”).
61. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a)–(b) (2012).
62. Id.; see also Dickey, Orszag & Tyson, supra note 57, at 369 (showing that it costs over
one billion dollars and takes ten years to undergo new drug testing).
63. See INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 58, at 39 (“The HatchWaxman Act allows for patent extensions based on the amount of time a drug spends in the FDA
review process.”).
64. See FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE
EVALUATIONS (ORANGE BOOK) iv (34th ed. 2014) (“Th[is] publication, Approved Drug Products
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (the List, commonly known as the Orange Book), identifies drug products approved on the basis of safety and effectiveness by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) under [Section 505, 21 U.S.C. § 355 of] the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act.”).
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“piggyback” on the testing carried out by the brand-name and to avoid conducting the same costly testing if the generic files for permission to market
its own version of a certain drug after the brand-name manufacturer has already gained FDA approval. 65 Generics can file ANDAs and forgo the
market testing requirements by asserting in their application that the generic
is bioequivalent to the brand-name drug. 66 Hatch-Waxman has arguably
achieved its goal of making more generics available; the generic drug share
of the prescription drug market grew from thirteen percent of the market in
1984 to over fifty-eight percent in 1994. 67
In their ANDAs, generics must provide assurance to the FDA that the
generic patent will not infringe on the brand-name’s patent. 68 Generics can
certify that their ANDAs will not infringe on a brand-name’s patent in four
distinct ways; the certification method relevant to this case requires a generic to demonstrate that any bioequivalent patent held by a brand-name is
“invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale” of the
drug described in the generic’s ANDA. 69 In this assertion, generic firms
can argue, for example, that a brand-name’s patent is invalid because it was
obtained unfairly, 70 or because it was “inherently anticipated by a prior
65. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).
66. Id. §§ 355 (j)(1), (2)(A)(iii)–(iv). In order to establish bioequivalence, a generic must
show that its drug has the same active ingredients as the brand-name drug and that the rate of absorption of the generic’s drug at the site at which it takes effect in the body is the same as the
brand-name’s product. Id.
67. INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 58, at 38.
68. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
69. Id.; see, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted
and judgment vacated sub nom., Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct.
2849 (2013) (mem.). In K-Dur, brand-name pharmaceutical company Schering-Plough owned a
patent for the extended-release coating of the drug K-Dur 20, a potassium chloride substance that
is used to treat high blood pressure. Id. In 1995, prior to the expiration of Schering’s patent,
Upsher-Smith Laboratories filed an ANDA for approval of a generic version of K-Dur 20,
prompting Schering to file suit against Upsher for patent infringement. Id. at 205. Within paragraph IV of its ANDA, and during discovery, Upsher certified that its generic product would not
infringe on Schering’s patent because the chemical composition of Upsher’s controlled release
coating was different from that of Schering’s brand-name drug. Id. See also In re Nexium
(Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., No. 12-MD-02409, 2013 WL 4832176 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2013).
In Nexium, generic drug company Ranbaxy filed an ANDA for a generic version of brand-name
AstraZeneca’s heartburn medicine Nexium, alleging in a paragraph IV certification that
Ranbaxy’s manufacture or sale of any generic version of Nexium would not infringe any of
AstraZeneca’s patents for Nexium to the extent that they expired after October 2007. Id. at *5.
Plaintiffs in Nexium asserted that AstraZeneca’s patent for Nexium’s active ingredient was issued
in error and would have been invalidated in the course of litigation because the active ingredient,
having already been discovered and in the public domain, was unpatentable. Id.
70. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (discussing a generic’s argument that a brand-name’s patent for ciprofloxacin hydrochloride would not be infringed because the brand-name had engaged in inequitable conduct in
procuring its patent), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). Inequitable conduct is a defense to a claim of patent infringement in which a defendant argues that a patent-
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art.” 71 This non-infringement certification is known as “paragraph IV” certification—named for its placement in paragraph IV of Section (j)(2)(A) of
the Hatch-Waxman Act—and, likewise, disputes surrounding a generic’s
attempt to certify that there is no infringement on a brand-name’s patent are
known as “paragraph IV litigation.” 72
A related statute, the Patent and Protection of Patent Rights Act,73
makes filing an ANDA under Hatch-Waxman an automatic act of patent infringement. 74 Hatch-Waxman therefore allows a brand-name manufacturer
forty-five days in which to respond to a generic’s ANDA filing with a cause
of action for infringement. 75 If a brand-name brings a patent infringement
suit against a generic ANDA filer within the forty-five day limit, the FDA
must withhold approval of the generic’s patent until the later of thirty
months from the date the suit is filed or the resolution of the lawsuit.76 Notably, once they enter the market, generic drugs become excessively popular
as compared to their more costly brand-name alternatives.77 FDA studies
show that one year after market entry, the average generic pharmaceutical
product takes over ninety percent of a brand-name’s unit sales and sells at
eighty-five percent of the price of the brand-name’s drug. 78
Hatch-Waxman also provides generics with a major incentive to be the
first to file an ANDA and allege that a brand-name’s patent will not be infringed. The Act stipulates that, if its ANDA is approved, the generic applicant that is the first to file an abbreviated application (“first-to-file generic”) will have 180 days of exclusivity from the first commercial marketing
holder’s patent is invalid because the patent-holder misstated facts or misdescribed inventorship in
the initial patent application. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1300
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
71. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1342, 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (discussing a generic’s argument that a brand-name’s patent was invalid on the grounds
of inherent anticipation by a prior patent). Under the doctrine of inherent anticipation, a patent
should be deemed invalid if a reference to prior art inherently discloses every feature of the
claimed new invention. Id. at 1343.
72. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2012). This Note will hereinafter refer to the litigation between brand-name and generic manufacturers in the context of a brand-name’s patent infringement challenge triggered by a generic’s filing an ANDA as “paragraph IV litigation.”
73. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
74. Id. § 271(e)(2).
75. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS
COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 8 (2010) [hereinafter PAY-FOR-DELAY], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offscost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf (noting
that approximately one year after the first generic company enters the market for a particular drug,
pharmacists fill about ninety percent of all prescriptions for that drug with the generic version,
rather than the brand-name version).
78. Id.
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of its drug, during which time no other generic can compete with the first
generic filer’s drug. 79 The 180-day exclusivity period is awarded to a generic as soon as its ANDA is granted, but only takes effect and begins running at the time that the generic first enters the market.80 Thus, even if a
generic’s entry is delayed by a number of years due to a provision in a settlement agreement with its adversarial brand-name, discussed infra, the generic still retains its exclusivity rights for 180 days from the time when it
finally markets its drug. 81 This 180-day exclusivity period proves extremely lucrative for generic firms; during the time that they are the only generic
on the market, companies can reap tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in
extra sales. 82
Like most litigation, settlements are abundant in the paragraph IV context. An FTC study showed that between 1992 and 2002, approximately
thirty-eight percent of pharmaceutical patent litigation related to ANDA
paragraph IV certifications resulted in a settlement between brand-name
and generic companies; and, of that thirty-eight percent, forty-five percent
of the settlements resulted in payments, ranging from $1.75 million to
$132.5 million, from the brand-name patent holder to the generic producer
in exchange for delayed entry. 83 Many of these payments come as compensation to generics for agreeing to delay the marketing of their ANDA drug
for a specified period of time. 84 This agreement to delay entry so that the
brand-name can remain exclusive, even after the generic’s approval for its
ANDA drug, understandably piques antitrust interest. Agreements involving payments between manufacturers in the same industry, for the purpose
of perpetuating a monopoly that otherwise would not exist, would appear to

79. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 281, 290 (2011) (citing Matthew J. Higgins & Stuart J. H. Graham, Balancing Innovation
and Access: Patent Challenges Tip the Scales, 326 SCIENCE 370, 370 (2009) (showing that 180
days of patent exclusivity is worth $60 million per drug on average)).
83. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN
FTC STUDY 17, 31, 35 (2002) [hereinafter GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drugentry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf (noting that twenty out of fiftythree (or thirty-eight percent) of patent litigation between a brand-name and the first generic
ANDA filer resulted in settlement, and that of those twenty settlements, nine contained stipulations for payments from the brand-name to the generic, which equals a total of forty-five percent
of settlements involving a reverse payment).
84. See id. at 31 (“Eight of the [nine] agreements [involving payments from brand-names to
generics] followed the same basic model. Each prohibited the generic applicant from purchasing,
manufacturing, using, selling, distributing, and shipping to third parties any form of the generic’s
drug product until the expiration of the [brand-name’s] patents.”).
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violate provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 85 the main body of federal
antitrust law. 86 For example, in one paragraph IV litigation settlement
agreement between brand-name manufacturer Hoecsht Marion Roussel, Inc.
and generic manufacturer Andrx Pharmaceuticals, the brand-name agreed to
pay the generic $40 million per year to delay entry into the market. 87 In a
similar settlement agreement regarding the patent for the breast cancer drug
Tamoxifen, a brand-name paid a generic $21 million in exchange for vacating the district court’s judgment that the brand-name’s patent was invalid. 88
B. Federal Circuit Courts Have Scrutinized Reverse Payment
Settlements Under Three Standards: the Strictest “Per Se
Illegality” Standard; the Lenient “Scope of the Patent” Test, and
the Middle Ground “Quick Look Rule of Reason Analysis”
1. The Strictest Per Se Illegality Standard
The Supreme Court has declared that “only unreasonable restraints” on
trade violate Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 89 and has deemed certain types of restraints unreasonable and unlawful per se, because they have
a “predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect.” 90 Typical examples
of per se unlawful violations of pro-competitive requirements are those that
can be characterized as blatant restraints on competition pertaining to prices
or territories. 91

85. 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (2012). The Sherman Act is aimed at preserving free competition and
preventing concentrated economic power from restricting trade. Jeffrey C. Sun & Philip T.K.
Daniel, The Sherman Act Antitrust Provisions and Collegiate Action: Should There Be a Continued Exception for the Business of the University?, 25 J.C. & U.L. 451, 453–54 (1999); see also
infra Part II.B (discussing how reverse payment settlement agreements can potentially violate antitrust laws, primarily those contained in provisions of the Sherman Act).
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal.”); Id. § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize . . . or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”).
87. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 899 (6th Cir. 2003).
88. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 2006).
89. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
90. Id.
91. See PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 77, at 3 (“Absent compensation to the generic for the
delay in its entry, such settlement agreements are unlikely to raise antitrust issues.”); see also
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (“Certain agreements,
such as horizontal price fixing and market allocation, are thought so inherently anticompetitive
that each is illegal per se without inquiry into the harm it has actually caused.”); Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984) (“Horizontal price
fixing and output limitation are ordinarily condemned as a matter of law under an ‘illegal per se’
approach because the probability that these practices are anticompetitive is so high.”); N. Pac. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (“Among the practices which the courts have heretofore
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was the first
federal appellate court to expressly consider reverse payment settlements in
a similar context to the challenge brought in Actavis, and it found those settlements to be per se violations of antitrust laws. 92 In the pioneering D.C.
Circuit case, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. International, 93
generic drug company Andrx Pharmaceuticals was the first ANDA filer for
the heart medication Cardizem CD, to which Hoecsht-Marion Roussel, Inc.
(“HMRI”), a brand-name company, held the patent.94 When Andrx filed its
ANDA, HMRI sued the generic for patent infringement, thereby triggering
the thirty-month waiting period during which the FDA could not approve
Andrx’s application. 95 Andrx and HMRI never made it to court; after the
thirty-month period, when the FDA finally approved Andrx’s ANDA,
HMRI and Andrx entered into a settlement agreement in which HMRI
agreed to compensate Andrx with quarterly payments of $10 million to delay marketing the generic product.96 In effect, the HMRI-Andrx agreement
allowed HMRI to pay off Andrx so that it could retain its monopoly on
Cardizem CD even after the FDA had approved Andrx’s generic version for
marketing. The D.C. Circuit found that the agreement between HMRI and
Andrx could “reasonably be viewed as an attempt to allocate market share
and preserve monopolistic conditions,” and treated the payment from the
brand-name to the generic as prima facie evidence of an illegal agreement
not to compete. 97
In 2003, the Sixth Circuit heard In Re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litiga98
tion, which concerned the same agreement that the D.C. Circuit considered in Andrx. 99 The Sixth Circuit case was brought by direct and indirect
purchasers of the medicine Cardizem CD, who alleged that they suffered
antitrust injury in the form of unnecessarily inflated drug prices as a result
of Andrx’s agreement with HMRI to delay market entry of Andrx’s drug. 100
The Sixth Circuit held that the Andrx–HMRI agreement was “a horizontal
agreement to eliminate competition in the market for Cardizem CD
throughout the entire United States, a classic example of a per se illegal re-

deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing . . . division of markets . . . group
boycotts . . . and tying arrangements.” (citations omitted)).
92. Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
93. 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
94. Id. at 803.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 811, 813.
98. 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
99. Id. at 902–03.
100. Id. at 903–04 & n.7.
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straint of trade.” 101 The court also emphasized a serious concern that reverse payment settlements encourage one manufacturer to pay another to
stay out of a particular market, which effectively prevents other competitors
from entering the market as well.102 Though these two courts found the reverse payment agreement in question to be per se illegal, all other federal
courts that have considered the applicability of antitrust law to reverse
payment settlements have declined to be as harsh and have not found such
settlements to be irrebuttably presumptively invalid.103
2. The Lenient Scope of the Patent Test
Most federal courts have utilized the “scope of the patent test” when
tasked with determining whether particular reverse payment settlements violate antitrust law. 104 The test presumes legality of reverse payment settlements on the grounds that the authority conferred by a patent on a patentholder allows the patent-holder to do whatever he likes related to the patent,
including exclude others from the market. 105 Under the scope of the patent
test, a reverse payment settlement is valid as long as it does not fall outside
of the scope of the patent-holder’s monopoly and the protections given to
the patent-holder by virtue of his holding a patent. 106
The Eleventh Circuit has considered the issue of reverse payment settlements in three significant cases. The first case, Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 107 concerned two agreements in which a brandname manufacturer agreed to pay generic manufacturers $30 million to refrain from entering the market until the end of the brand-name’s patent

101. Id. at 908.
102. Id. (“[I]t is one thing to take advantage of a monopoly that naturally arises from a patent,
but another thing altogether to bolster the patent’s effectiveness in inhibiting competitors by paying the only potential competitor $40 million per year to stay out of the market.”). The Sixth Circuit’s concern regarding this reverse payment settlement partly stemmed from the fact that, in delaying Andrx’s generic entry, the Andrx-HMRI settlement agreement also prevented other
generics, whose ANDAs for Cardizem CD had been approved by the FDA, from entering the
market. Id. at 907. Andrx, as the first generic ANDA filer, retained its right to a 180-day period
of exclusivity, which would begin running the day that Andrx’s generic product hit the market.
Id. In stalling Andrx’s market entry, HMRI and Andrx were also effectively stalling the entry of
other generic competitors who could not market their versions of Cardizem CD until Andrx’s 180day period of exclusivity had run out. Id.
103. See infra Parts II.B.2–II.B.3.
104. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Federal, Second, and
Eleventh Circuits’ use of the “scope of the patent test”).
105. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304–06, 1312 (11th Cir.
2003).
106. Id. at 1312.
107. 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). In this case, a brand-name drug manufacturer filed
claims against generic manufacturers for patent infringement, and the generic manufacturers defended on the ground of patent invalidity. Id. at 1298–99.
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term. 108 Even though the patent at issue was subsequently declared invalid, 109 the Eleventh Circuit held that the patent gave the brand-name manufacturer the right to exclude competitors.110 In so ruling, the court emphasized policy considerations favoring the settlement of patent litigation. 111
The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case and directed the district court to determine whether any part of the agreement exceeded the protections afforded by the brand-name manufacturer’s patent and, if so, to apply traditional
antitrust scrutiny only to those portions of the agreement. 112 The court
therefore articulated and employed a scope of the patent test to analyze the
legality of the reverse payment settlement. 113
A subsequent Eleventh Circuit case, Schering–Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 114 arose out of the settlement agreement between a
brand-name, Schering-Plough, and a generic, Upsher-Smith Laboratories,
regarding the marketing of, and patent for, the hypertension drug K-Dur
20. 115 After the FTC determined, during an administrative proceeding, that
the agreement violated antitrust laws, the defendants appealed the FTC’s
finding to the Eleventh Circuit. 116 Applying the scope of the patent test articulated in Valley Drug, the Eleventh Circuit set aside the ruling of the
FTC. 117 The court rejected the FTC’s conclusion that Schering’s $60 million payment to Upsher was in exchange only for a market entry delay,
finding instead that the payment was only for the licenses that Schering obtained through the agreement to market five Upsher products.118 As such,
the court found that there was no reverse payment from Schering to Upsher
and, thus, no antitrust violation in that agreement.119
In Federal Trade Commission v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 120 the
predecessor to this Note’s principal case, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly articulated, in accordance with its past holdings regarding reverse payment
108. Id. at 1300.
109. Id. at 1306.
110. Id. at 1312 (“We recognize the patent exception to antitrust liability, but also recognize
that the exception is limited by the terms of the patent and the statutory rights granted to the patentee. . . . The appropriate analysis on remand will likely require an identification of the protection afforded by the patents . . . .”).
111. Id. at 1308 n.20.
112. Id. at 1312.
113. Id.
114. 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
115. Id. at 1058–59.
116. Id. at 1061.
117. Id. at 1065–66, 1076.
118. Id. at 1069–71.
119. Id. at 1071.
120. 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223
(2013).
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settlements, that the only determination required in such actions is whether,
“absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent,” the settlement
agreement exceeded the scope of the patent. 121
The Eleventh Circuit’s standard is thus articulated in commentary as
the scope of the patent test.122 Under this standard, the court examines: “(1)
the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which
the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.” 123 Because this standard focuses on the nearly endless rights that a
patent-holder retains as part of its patent monopoly—including the right to
cripple competition and charge artificially higher prices124—the scope of
the patent test is viewed as giving a presumption of nearly irrefutable validity for reverse payment settlements. 125
In 2006, the Second Circuit heard In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litigation 126 and affirmatively adopted the Eleventh Circuit’s scope of the
patent test. 127 The settlement at issue in Tamoxifen called for the brandname manufacturer to make a payment of $21 million to the generic manufacturer in exchange for the generic’s request that the district court vacate
its decision that the brand-name’s patent for Tamoxifen was invalid.128 Despite awareness of the district court’s initial finding, the Second Circuit applied a presumption of patent validity and held that, absent the patent being
obtained by fraud, there is “no injury to the market cognizable existing under antitrust law, as long as competition is restrained only within the scope

121. Id. at 1312.
122. See, e.g., Timothy A. Cook, Note, Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements: Balancing Patent & Antitrust Policy Through Institutional Choice, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 417, 433 (2011) (referring to the Eleventh Circuit’s test as a “patent-scope analysis”); Shannon U. Han, Note, Pay-to-Delay Settlements: The Circuit-Splitting Headache Plaguing Big Pharma, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 913, 926, 939 (2013) (referring to the Eleventh Circuit’s test as
the “scope of the patent test”).
123. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1066; Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344
F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003).
124. See Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1304 (“A patent grants its owner the lawful right to exclude others. This exclusionary right is granted to allow the patentee to exploit whatever degree
of market power it might gain thereby as an incentive to induce investment in innovation and the
public disclosure of inventions. The exclusionary right cannot be exploited in every way—
patentees cannot pool their patents and fix the prices at which licensees will sell the patented article, for example—but a patentee can choose to exclude everyone from producing the patented article or can choose to be the sole supplier itself . . . .” (citations omitted)).
125. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[W]e take issue with
the scope of the patent test’s almost unrebuttable presumption of patent validity.”), cert. granted
and judgment vacated sub nom. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct.
2849 (2013) (mem.).
126. 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).
127. Id. at 213.
128. Id. at 190.
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of the patent.” 129 The Second Circuit recognized the potentially troubling
implications of its holding, that “[t]he less sound the patent . . . and therefore the less justified the monopoly enjoyed by the patent holder, the more a
rule permitting settlement is likely to benefit the patent holder.” 130 Ultimately, however, the court determined that the judicial preference for settlement was too strong not to find the reverse payment settlement agreement presumptively lawful.131
The Federal Circuit also utilized the scope of the patent test in its adjudication of In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 132 a
case involving a pharmaceutical reverse payment settlement between a
brand-name pharmaceutical giant, Bayer, and a generic manufacturer, Barr
Laboratories, in paragraph IV litigation over Barr’s ANDA for Ciprofloxacin, an antibiotic used to treat various infections, including anthrax infection. 133 In exchange for Barr dropping its patent validity challenge to
Bayer’s NDA drug and its paragraph IV certification, Bayer agreed to pay
Barr $398.1 million over a number of years, including an initial payment of
$49.1 million. 134 The Federal Circuit used the scope of the patent test and
rejected the antitrust challenge to the Bayer-Barr reverse payment settlement, reasoning that “[s]ettlement of patent claims by agreement between
the parties—including exchange of consideration—rather than by litigation
is not precluded by the Sherman Act even though it may have some adverse
effects on competition.” 135 The court thus gave weight to judicial partiality
toward settlement in deciding that “in the absence of evidence of fraud . . .
or sham litigation, the court need not consider the validity of the patent in
the antitrust analysis of a settlement agreement involving a reverse payment.” 136
3. The Middle Ground “Quick Look Rule of Reason” Analysis
The Third Circuit did not adopt the “scope of the patent test” and instead applied a “quick look rule of reason” test in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation. 137 The determination of antitrust violations under this test is based
on a three-step “rule of reason” analysis. First, the plaintiff “‘bears the ini129. Id. at 212–13 (citation omitted).
130. Id. at 211.
131. Id.
132. 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223
(2013).
133. Id. at 1327–29.
134. Id. at 1328–29 & n.5.
135. Id. at 1333 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 & n.5 (1931)).
136. Id. at 1333, 1336.
137. 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom. UpsherSmith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013) (mem.).
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tial burden of showing that the challenged action has had an actual adverse
effect on competition in the relevant market.’” 138 Then, if the plaintiff succeeds, “‘the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the pro-competitive
“redeeming virtues” of the action.’” 139 If the defendant carries his burden,
the plaintiff must then show that “‘the same pro-competitive effect could be
achieved through an alternative means that is less restrictive of competition.’” 140 In K-Dur, the Third Circuit chose a middle ground between the
per se illegality standard and the “scope of the patent test,” explaining that
it would examine a pay-for-delay situation using a modified version of the
rule of reason analysis: a “quick look rule of reason test.” 141 Under this
analysis, any payment from a patent holder to a generic patent challenger
that agrees to delay entry into the market is a presumptively illegal restraint
of trade. 142 This presumption can be rebutted, however, by a demonstration
“that the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some pro-competitive benefit.”143
The Third Circuit rejected the Eleventh, Sixth, and Second Circuits’
presumption of patent validity under the scope of the patent test because
many patents issued by the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) are later
found invalid or not infringed. Therefore, the correct standard is one that
adjudges patents based on the strong likelihood that “reverse payments enable the holder of a patent that the holder knows is weak to buy its way out
of both competition with the challenging competitor and possible invalidation of the patent.” 144 To resolve the standards dispute among the federal
circuits, the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear Actavis. 145
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh
Circuit’s holding that reverse payment settlement agreements are immune
from antitrust proceedings and remanded the case for further proceed-

138. Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 215 (citing In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 211 (2005)).
145. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013). This dispute was further exacerbated
when the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Third Circuit’s harsher quick look rule of reason analysis in
favor of its own lenient scope of the patent test. FTC v. Watson Pharm. Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1309
(2012).
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ings. 146 In so doing, the Court made clear it was not ruling on whether the
FTC had a legitimate claim against Actavis for anti-competition conspiracy;
rather, the Court simply held that antitrust law was eligible to govern the
instant patent dispute, and thus the case should not have been dismissed. 147
The Court placed great emphasis on Solvay Pharmaceutical’s having been
embroiled in a litigation dispute with Actavis and other generics regarding
the validity of Solvay’s patent because, according to the Court, only a definitively valid patent “‘excludes all except its owner from the use of the protected process or product.’” 148 An invalid patent, therefore, gives its owner
no such power. 149 Because the paragraph IV litigation put Solvay’s patent
validity at issue, the Court concluded that the right to exclusivity that would
normally be conferred to Solvay, by virtue of its holding the patent for AndroGel, did not apply. 150 The Court found that exclusivity and monopoly
rights can only accompany valid patents; thus, where a patent may not be
valid, a court logically cannot find that a patent-holder acted within the
scope of his patent rights because those rights may not exist.151
The Court further held that the Eleventh Circuit’s sole reliance on patent law, as opposed to antitrust law or pro-competitive policy, was erroneous, particularly given the FTC’s stated concerns regarding the anticompetitive consequences of the settlement.152 From the FTC’s perspective, the situation appeared clear: a brand-name pharmaceutical giant had
paid off generic manufacturers to delay entry into a competitive drug market, thereby ensuring that the brand-name’s monopoly would continue to
thrive. 153
The Court substantiated its holding by looking to its prior decisions in
antitrust-patent settlement cases outside of the pharmaceutical realm. In
United States v. Line Material Co., 154 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 155
and Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical
Corp., 156 which all involved antitrust attacks on patent-related settlements
in various machinery industries, the Court resolved questions of settlement

146. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justice Alito took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case.
147. Id. at 2227.
148. Id. at 2231 (quoting United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948)).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2230–31.
152. Id. at 2231.
153. Id. at 2230.
154. 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
155. 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
156. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
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legality by balancing the “lawful restraint on trade of the patent monopoly
and the illegal restraint prohibited by the Sherman Act.”157 According to
the majority, in these historical cases the Court examined traditional antitrust principles, such as the probability that anti-competitive effects would
flow from the settlement, instead of looking solely at the rights that the patent conferred. 158 Moreover, the majority noted that antitrust laws may be
applicable to patent litigation because the Supreme Court has found that patent-related settlements can violate antitrust laws.159
The Court concluded its analysis by summarizing policy and fairness
considerations that favored giving the FTC an opportunity to litigate its antitrust claim. 160 First, the Court emphasized the importance of allowing an
antitrust challenge to the reverse payment agreement between Solvay and
Actavis (and other generics) because the pay-for-delay term in their agreement appeared on its face to have the potential for anti-competitive effects. 161 The Court also asserted that because the payments made from
brand-names to generics in reverse payment settlement agreements might be
perfectly legitimate (for example, such a payment might be made to cover a
generic’s litigation costs, which is a valid settlement provision that does not
violate antitrust law), this potential legitimacy does not justify dismissing
an allegedly injured plaintiff’s complaint.162 Just as the defendant should
have an opportunity to explain his settlement payment and to avoid liability,
so too should a plaintiff, in this case the FTC, retain the right to challenge
that settlement payment if the plaintiff is suspicious about its collusive effects. 163
Although the Court acknowledged the possible applicability of antitrust law to pay-for-delay arrangements, it ultimately declined to conclude
that reverse payment settlement agreements are unlawful, and even declined
to decide the instant issue.164 Instead, the Court held that the FTC’s antitrust claim should have had an opportunity to be heard, and remanded the
case. 165

157. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. at 310.
158. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231.
159. Id. at 2232; see also, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 190–92 (1963)
(finding illegal and in violation of antitrust law a settlement between three sewing machine manufacturers with competing patent claims, in which the firms assigned the patent rights to the manufacturer best able to defend and to enforce the patent against future competition).
160. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234–37.
161. Id. at 2234.
162. Id. at 2236.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2237.
165. Id. at 2238.
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In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, relied on a precedential argument to dispute the majority’s holding. 166
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that a patent “provides an exception to
antitrust law, and the scope of the patent—i.e., the rights conferred by the
patent—forms the zone within which the patent holder may operate without
facing antitrust liability.” 167 The Chief Justice noted that the Court had
“never held that it violates antitrust law for a competitor to refrain from
challenging a patent . . . [and had] long recognized that the settlement of patent litigation does not by itself violate the antitrust laws.” 168 According to
the dissent, the Court would be “cross[ing] [the] Rubicon,” doing something that had never been done in the 123-year existence of the Sherman
Act, in allowing antitrust law to dictate the legality of patent infringement
settlements. 169 Further, the dissent argued that only patent law should apply
in patent cases, where the subject matter is both unique in and of itself and
insulated from punishment by other laws.170
The dissent instead advocated for the use of the lenient “scope of the
patent” standard, and argued that the majority should have adopted this
standard as the fundamental test for adjudging reverse payment settlements. 171 In so reasoning, Chief Justice Roberts opined that the majority
had misinterpreted the essential holdings of prior cases that examined patent-related settlements in various industries, such as electrical devices and
sewing. 172 According to the dissent, these cases stand for the proposition
that “patent settlements—and for that matter, any agreements relating to patents—are subject to antitrust scrutiny only if they confer benefits beyond
the scope of the patent.” 173 Moreover, the dissent stated the fact that patentrelated settlement agreements can sometimes violate antitrust laws does not
necessitate subjecting a patent settlement to antitrust scrutiny, particularly
not, as the majority reasoned, because the validity of the patent is uncer-

166. Id. at 2238–39 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2238.
168. Id. at 2239.
169. Id. at 2242.
170. Id. at 2240.
171. Id. at 2239; see also supra Part II.B (explaining that the scope of the patent standard
views reverse payment settlements as presumptively lawful exercises within the scope of the monopoly power conferred on patent-holders by the virtue of their holding patents).
172. Id. at 2240–41. Chief Justice Roberts cited United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S.
287 (1948), United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963), United States v. New
Wrinkle, Inc., 324 U.S. 371 (1952), and Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931), as
examples of cases that the majority misinterpreted in Justice Breyer’s opinion. Id.
173. Id. at 2242. In contrast, in his majority opinion, Justice Breyer had held that cases like
Line Material and Standard Oil stand for the proposition that antitrust law in fact must apply to
patent-related settlements. Id. at 2232–33 (majority opinion).
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tain. 174 Lastly, the dissent noted that the significant costs of patent litigation and the judicial preference for settlement should predominate over concerns about patent validity, and that these economic interests would therefore seem to mandate use of the scope of the patent test. 175
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court’s holding in Actavis struck the correct balance in characterizing reverse payment settlements as not per se illegal, and yet not immune
from antitrust attack. 176 The Court, however, missed two crucial opportunities to clarify this area of the law, particularly in light of the fact that Actavis was the first reverse payment settlement case the Court has chosen to
hear. 177
First, in refusing to announce a comprehensive test for application of
the rule of reason analysis, the Court did not fully resolve the issue of how
to evaluate reverse payment settlements—an issue that has beleaguered federal circuit courts for the past two decades.178 Rather than skirt the issue as
it did, the Court should have declared that the Third Circuit’s quick look
rule of reason analysis is the proper standard by which to judge brandname-generic settlements that include pay-for-delay clauses. 179 Among the
several disparate frameworks for judging reverse payment settlements
adopted by the federal circuit courts, the Third Circuit’s quick look rule of
reason analysis most effectively balances the need to incentivize brandname drug development with the need to encourage generic market entry in
order to create competition and lower drug prices, as Hatch-Waxman intended. 180 The quick look rule of reason analysis provides a stricter standard of scrutiny to ensure that a reverse payment settlement is legitimate and
not a manifestation of anti-competitive practices or a desire to maintain an
illegal market monopoly. 181 Moreover, announcing an authoritative, comprehensive standard, and giving examples of how that standard would apply
to typical reverse payment agreements, would ease administrability for

174. Id. at 2242 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 2243–44.
176. See infra Part IV.A.
177. See infra Parts IV.B–C.
178. See supra Part III.
179. See infra Part IV.B.
180. See 130 CONG. REC. 24,430 (daily ed., Sept. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman)
(“[Proposed amendments to Hatch-Waxman that were later incorporated] do not upset the fundamental balance of the bill that assures consumers of more low-cost generic drugs when a valid
patent expires and the drug industry of sufficient incentive to develop innovative pharmaceutical
therapies.”).
181. See infra Part IV.B.
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courts determining the legality of reverse payment settlements going forward. 182
Second, although the Court explicitly refrained from finding reverse
payment settlements per se illegal, the majority opinion reveals dissatisfaction with the reverse payment model that is the inevitable result of HatchWaxman’s regulatory design. 183 As such, the Court should have recommended, as a policy consideration for lower courts, a requirement of judicial settlement approval for future reverse payment agreements. 184 This
policy would likely discourage brand-name drug manufacturers from bringing frivolous suits to defend knowingly weak or non-infringed patents, and
would also allow generic manufacturers to more easily defend their patent
claims and disincentivize their knee-jerk settlement reaction.185 Such a policy recommendation would target and eliminate the risk-seeking and riskaverse behavior that induces brand-names and generics to settle, and would
therefore address the root problem of ubiquitous reverse payment settlements that negatively impact consumers.186
A. The Court’s Holding Struck the Correct Balance Between Per Se
Illegality of Reverse Settlement Payments and Immunity from
Antitrust Attack
1. The Court Appropriately Found That Reverse Payment
Settlements Are Not Per Se Illegal
In Actavis, the Supreme Court declined to find reverse payment settlements per se illegal restraints on trade, 187 despite their essential character
as a collusive market allocation in the pharmaceutical sphere. 188 Two spec182. See infra Part IV.B; see also Steven J. Cernak & Kelly L. Morron, District Courts Struggle to Apply Direction from Actavis in Reverse Payment Cases Re: Antitrust Litigation, NAT’L L.
REV. (Mar. 9, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/district-courts-struggle-to-applydirection-actavis-reverse-payment-cases-re-antitru (“In its 2013 opinion in FTC v. Actavis, the
Supreme Court . . . instructed lower courts to apply antitrust law’s rule of reason to so-called ‘reverse payment’ cases.”).
183. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2233 (2013) (“[T]here is nothing novel about
our approach. What does appear novel [as a legal doctrine] are the dissent’s suggestions that a
patent holder may simply ‘pa[y] a competitor to’ . . . quit its patent invalidity or noninfringement
claim without any antitrust scrutiny.”); Id. at 2230 (“[W]e do not agree that [holding a patent] . . .
can immunize [a reverse payment] agreement from antitrust attack.”); see also Dolin, supra note
82, at 283 (“The rise of reverse settlement agreements is a direct consequence of the incentives
created by the Hatch-Waxman Act.”).
184. See infra Part IV.C.
185. See infra Part IV.C.
186. See infra Part IV.C.
187. See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining per se illegal restraints on trade).
188. See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907–08 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The
[settlement] [a]greement guaranteed to [the brand-name manufacturer] that its only potential com-
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ulative reasons exist for the Court’s decision not to find the pay-for-delay
process presumptively unlawful. First, courts are generally unwilling to
apply per se proscriptions to potentially violative conduct that arises in new
industries or in areas where such a finding of anti-competitive infringement
has not previously been made or considered.189 Because only the Sixth and
D.C. Circuits have concluded that reverse payment settlements are presumptively unlawful, 190 it is likely the Court was hesitant to announce a
strict per se illegal standard in an unfamiliar area. This conjecture is especially credible in light of the fact that it is often unclear how a court would
acquire enough experience in an area to deem a seemingly horizontal
agreement as a naked, per se violation. 191
Second, and more significantly, the Court would have been erroneous
in concluding that reverse payment settlements are per se illegal because, in
paragraph IV litigation, the brand-name’s patent is not always invalid or the
generic’s patent does not always infringe. The FTC has shown that generics prevail in seventy-three percent of patent challenge cases; but, that figure leaves over twenty-five percent of cases in which the generic’s attempt-

petitor at that time . . . would, for the price of $10 million per quarter, refrain from marketing its
generic version of Cardizem CD even after it had obtained FDA approval. . . . There is simply no
escaping the conclusion that the [a]greement . . . was, at its core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”). Federal courts have found that market allocations in
other arenas are also facially blatant horizontal restraints on trade such that they are per se unlawful. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990) (finding a market allocation
where two bar exam companies agreed not to compete with one another in certain areas was facially unlawful); United States v. Brown, 936 F.2d 1042, 1044–45 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding per se
illegal an agreement between billboard advertising companies that prohibited one another from
competing from each other’s former leaseholds for one year after a billboard space was “lost or
abandoned”).
189. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458–59 (1986) (“[W]e have been
slow . . . to extend per se analysis to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships
where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.”); United States v.
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972) (“It is only after considerable experience with
certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations . . . .”).
190. See In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 907–08 (holding that a reverse payment settlement
agreement was “at its core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market,” and
was therefore a “classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade”); Andrx Pharm., Inc. v.
Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that a pay-for-delay agreement
between generic and brand name pharmaceutical manufacturers fell in the category of per se illegality because it could be viewed as an effort to “preserve monopolistic conditions”).
191. See McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 896–97 (D. Minn. 1992) (applying a rule of reason analysis, as opposed to finding per se illegal a series of rules governing football teams’ first refusal and compensation rights following the expiration of player contracts, despite having considered per se illegality in such instances in earlier decisions). But cf. Ariz. v.
Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 349, 357 (1982) (holding that a maximum fee arrangement among medical service providers was per se illegal, despite having never addressed the
antitrust implications of a similar arrangement in the medical arena).
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ed entry into the market would impede on a brand-name’s patent.192 Moreover, although some patent law scholars believe that paragraph IV litigation
is a signal of patent invalidity, 193 Professor William Landes and Judge
Richard Posner have presented data that contradicts the FTC’s arguments
for patent weakness, including a “remarkable increase” in patent validity
holdings since the beginning of the Federal Circuit. 194 Prior to the Federal
Circuit’s inception, courts held patents valid in approximately forty-five
percent of cases; but the Federal Circuit, which has been starkly in favor of
finding patent validity, has increased that number to the sixty-five to seventy percent range. 195 In many instances, then, it is evident that much paragraph IV litigation has ended and could end in a brand-name’s patent being
held valid. If the Court had declared a standard that presumed illegality of
reverse payment settlements, brand-names would be unfairly limited in
their capacity to dictate the settlement terms of unfair challenges to their
rightly-held patents before litigation. Furthermore, they would thereby improperly diminish the judicial resources that should appropriately be at their
disposal.
2. The Court Properly Found That Reverse Payment Settlements
Can Be Analyzed Using Antitrust Law
In addition to finding that pay-for-delay is not a per se illegal practice,
the Court also correctly held that antitrust challenges to pay-for-delay settlements are very much justiciable, and that the legality of such settlements
can be judged based on antitrust principles. Typical private antitrust actions
for damages require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s restraints on trade caused the plaintiff injury in fact, or, if seeking injunctive
relief, that the defendant’s actions threatened the plaintiff with loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws. 196 When the FTC brings a claim
against generic and brand-name drug manufacturers for anti-competitive
collusion, the government must show that the agreement in question had an
injurious impact on consumers participating in the pharmaceutical indus-

192. GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION, supra note 83, at 13, 20.
193. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1998) (analyzing how patents fare in court).
194. Steven W. Day, Note, Leaving Room for Innovation: Rejecting the FTC’s Stance Against
Reverse Payments in Schering-Plough v. FTC, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 223, 248 (2006) (citing
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 338–39 (2003)).
195. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 338 tbl.12.1 (2003); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The
Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 25–30 (1989) (examining the Federal Circuit’s pro-patent stance).
196. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 26 (2012).
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try. 197 In their challenges to reverse payment settlements, including Actavis, the FTC has alleged that massive public economic injury, to the tune
of $3.5 billion, results from the pay-for-delay framework. 198 The FTC argues that this framework not only denies consumers access to competitive
pricing on pharmaceuticals, but also forces consumers to pay the brandname’s costs included in the reverse payment settlement amounts transferred to generics in the form of increased brand-name drug prices. 199
Despite the FTC’s demonstration of injury-in-fact to consumers, the
Eleventh Circuit held—prior to Actavis—that although antitrust laws would
ordinarily prohibit pay-for-delay arrangements,200 reverse payment settlements in the patent arena present “atypical cases” because one of the parties
owns a patent, giving them the legal right to a monopoly. 201 This presumption of patent validity, combined with the heavy weight of public policy in
favor of settlement, led the Eleventh Circuit to conclude that courts could
not force parties to continue litigating in order to avoid a possible violation
of antitrust principles.202
As the Court in Actavis recognized, the Eleventh Circuit’s determination of the non-justiciability of the FTC’s claim turned on an erroneous presumption that the brand-name company’s patent is always valid. 203 Although some federal courts have refused to consider patent validity when
scrutinizing reverse payment settlements204 because patents are presumed

197. Marlee P. Kutcher, Comment, Waiting Is the Hardest Part: Why the Supreme Court
Should Adopt the Third Circuit’s Analysis of Pay-for-Delay Settlement Agreements, 44 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 1093, 1151 (2013).
198. See id. at 2.
199. See PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 77, at 2 (finding that pay-for-delay arrangements cost
Americans $3.5 billion per year); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT,
AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2012, A REPORT
BY THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION 1–2 (2013) [hereinafter AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FTC],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130117mmareport.pdf (finding that the number of
reverse payment settlements rose from twenty-eight in 2011 to forty in 2012, and involved brandname pharmaceutical products with combined annual U.S. sales of $8.3 billion).
200. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003).
201. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. FTC
v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
202. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (citing Watson Pharm. Inc., 677 F.3d at 1313–14).
203. Id. at 2231.
204. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“[I]n the absence of evidence of fraud before the PTO or sham litigation, the court need not
consider the validity of the patent in the antitrust analysis of a settlement agreement involving a
reverse payment.”), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Tamoxifen
Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the validity of the patent
need not be considered in the analysis of whether the settlement agreement violates antitrust law),
abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
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valid by law, 205 such refusal is in error given two propositions. First, the
refusal to consider patent validity in adjudging reverse payment settlements
ignores the aforementioned FTC findings that the majority of generic challenges to brand-name patents reveal the brand-name patent’s weakness, 206
which can thereby often make the brand-name’s claim of patent infringement frivolous. Second, refusal to consider patent validity ignores the fact
that “[a] patent, in the last analysis, simply represents a legal conclusion
reached by the Patent Office,” 207 and not an infallible proclamation, as
demonstrated by the FTC’s study. 208
B. The Court Should Have Adopted the Third Circuit’s Quick Look
Rule of Reason Analysis
As previously discussed, the Third Circuit announced in In re K-Dur
that it would break from the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits’ prosettlement scope of the patent test, which mandates an irrefutable presumption of the brand-name’s existing patent validity and is grounded in the
principle that patent holders can do what they please within the scope of the
patent’s monopoly protections. 209 Instead of adopting this lenient framework, the Third Circuit implemented a “quick look rule of reason analysis,”
in which a finder of fact must treat “any payment from a patent holder to a
generic patent challenger as part of an agreement that delays the generic’s
market entry as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of
trade.” 210 The quick look rule of reason analysis falls between the lenient
scope of the patent test and the harsh per se rule of illegality for “predictable and pernicious” restraints.211 Fundamentally, the quick look rule of reason test differs from the scope of the patent test in that the former specifies
a rebuttable presumption of reverse payment settlement illegality, while the
latter specifies a rebuttable presumption of legality.
FTC v. Actavis marked the first time the Supreme Court heard a payfor-delay case, both despite and because of the fact that the legality of re-

205. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
206. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION, supra note 83, at viii (finding that generic drug companies prevailed in seventy-three percent of cases wherein they challenged a brand-name’s patent validity); see also PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 77, at 3 (same).
207. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 215 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969)), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom. Upsher-Smith
Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013) (mem.).
208. PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 77, at 3.
209. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209; see also supra Part II.C (explaining the Third Circuit’s implementation of a new “quick look rule of reason” analysis for pay-for-delay agreements and how
it differs from other federal circuits’ “scope of the patent” test).
210. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.
211. See supra Parts II.B.1–2.
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verse payment settlements had been litigated in federal courts for decades. 212 Given that the Court granted the FTC’s petition for certiorari precisely to resolve the issue that different standards are used by the courts in
reverse payment settlement cases,213 it is perplexing that the Court did not
in fact annunciate a workable set of criteria for courts to use in future cases.
The Court ultimately declared that the FTC’s challenge to the ActavisSolvay settlement was justiciable, and that a typical antitrust rule of reason
test could be used; however, in declining to adopt either the scope of the patent test or the quick look rule of reason analysis, the Court avoided the
most essential issue of the case. Ruling on the overall legality of reverse
payment settlement claims, without explaining in detail the test that should
be employed to adjudicate such claims, is remarkably problematic. Consequently, this failure on the part of the Court has already resulted in confusion among federal courts faced with pay-for-delay challenges. 214
1. The Court Correctly Declined to Adopt the Scope of the Patent
Test
The Court in Actavis should have announced a definitive standard and,
in doing so, should have adopted the Third Circuit’s quick look rule of reason analysis over the scope of the patent test.215 As discussed in Part IV.A,
the scope of the patent test’s almost unrebuttable presumption of patent validity ignores the reality that generic challengers often prevail in paragraph
IV litigation. 216 This further undermines the appropriateness of using the
scope of the patent test and its presumption of patent validity in pay-fordelay cases. Reverse payment settlements thereby enable a brand-name patent holder—that knows its patent is weak—to buy its way out of competition and into a greater period of monopoly than it would rightly have if its
patent were invalid. 217

212. See supra Parts I & II.B (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear Actavis to
resolve the competing standards used by federal courts in judging reverse payment settlements,
and discussing those varying standards).
213. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013).
214. See Cernak & Morron, supra note 182 (noting that the U.S. District Courts for the Districts of Massachusetts and New Jersey have struggled to apply the Court’s “ambiguous guidance”
set forth in Actavis).
215. See supra Parts II.C.2–3.
216. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION, supra note 83, at viii (finding that in paragraph IV litigation, generic challengers prevailed seventy-three percent of the
time); see also Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside
the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 380, 385 (2000) (finding that between 1983 and 1999, the
alleged infringer (the generic) prevailed in forty-two percent of paragraph IV cases that reached
trial).
217. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 215 (3d Cir. 2012).
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Moreover, the scope of the patent test does not properly address
whether a generic’s patent indeed infringes on a brand-name’s patent. In
some paragraph IV cases, generics filing an ANDA purport, and can objectively show, that their desired patent does not infringe because it conveys
the rights to something fundamentally different from what the brand-name
holds. 218 In other cases, generic challengers can rightfully assert that their
patents will not infringe because a brand-name’s patent will have expired
by the time that the generic version of the drug is marketable.219 Yet, in
both of these scenarios, where it is clear that there is no infringement and
the brand-name’s patent validity is not even in question, brand-name manufacturers pursue patent infringement suits against generic drug companies,
which yield exorbitant settlement agreements for generics and perpetuate
the pay-for-delay framework. 220 Because the scope of the patent test presumes patent validity and solely examines whether a patent holder’s settlement action exceeds the scope of its monopoly, it cannot effectively be used
to judge settlement situations where the issue of validity was irrelevant because the generic simply would not infringe. If the applicable test focuses
on brand-name patent validity, injured challengers cannot possibly win an
antitrust claim against a reverse payment settlement wherein the patent’s
validity was never even at issue. The quick look rule of reason analysis,
however, provides a proper framework for adjudging reverse payment settlements because, rather than focusing on the validity of the patent in question, it focuses on the context, the terms of the settlement, and the “economic realities” of pay-for-delay that cost consumers billions. 221
2. The Court Should Have Affirmatively Adopted the Quick Look
Rule of Reason Analysis
In contrast to the scope of the patent test, the quick look rule of reason
analysis provides a balance between respecting brand-name patent-holders’
rights and allowing generic manufacturers to enter the market when they are
confident that their drug will not infringe. In finding a pay-for-delay provi218. See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 902 (6th Cir. 2003). In
Cardizem, brand-name manufacturer Hoecsht Marion Roussel, Inc. (“HMRI”) held the patent for
the “dissolution profile” (the amount of a drug to be released into a person’s system in a given
period) of zero to forty-five percent of the active ingredient in the prescription hypertension drug
Cardizem CD. Id. In its ANDA to market a generic version of the drug, generic manufacturer
Andrx Pharmaceuticals specified that its formula had a dissolution profile of not less than fiftyfive percent. Id. Despite the disparate dissolution profiles, HMRI “nonetheless” continued to pursue patent infringement litigation against Andrx. Id.
219. E.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 193
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).
220. See supra Parts II.A–B (discussing the high prices that brand-names will pay to generics
to delay generic market entry through paragraph IV litigation reverse payment settlements).
221. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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sion in a generic-brand name settlement to be rebuttable prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation, 222 the quick look rule of reason analysis targets the harmful collusion that is the fundamental problem with these settlements. At the crux of anti-competitive issues with reverse payment
settlements is that generic drug manufacturers are monetarily incentivized
to delay entry and disincentivized to pursue litigation, even when they are
confident that they will not infringe on a brand-name’s patent. Nothing in
the Third Circuit’s quick look rule of reason analysis limits parties’ ability
to reach settlements or negotiate generic drug entry dates without compensation for delay. 223 Instead, only settlements in which a brand-name pays a
generic to stay out of a particular market will require the manufacturers to
rebut a presumption of illegality. 224 Notably, FTC data suggests that this
rule will only affect a small minority of pharmaceutical settlements; nearly
seventy-five percent of Hatch-Waxman Act infringement suits that settled
from 2004 to 2009 (152 out of 218 final settlement agreements) did so
without reverse payments. 225
In his dissenting opinion in Actavis, Chief Justice Roberts predicated
his support for the scope of the patent test in part on the fact that judicial
preference for settlement should be given the highest priority. 226 The scope
of the patent test is certainly much more pro-settlement than the quick look
rule of reason analysis because it essentially declares reverse payment settlements unreviewable.227 Indeed, in considering whether to find pay-fordelay arrangements valid or invalid, many federal courts have given great
weight to the economic advantages of settlement over expensive patent litigation. 228 Although encouraging cooperative settlement is certainly an im222. See supra Part II.B.3.
223. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted and
judgment vacated sub nom. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849
(2013) (mem.).
224. Id. at 218.
225. AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FTC, supra note 199, at 2; PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note
77, at 4–5.
226. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2243 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
227. See supra Part II.C.
228. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2012) (arguing that
“[o]ur legal system can ill afford” to “undo much of the benefit of settling patent litigation, and
discourage settlements”), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); Erheart v.
Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 595 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Settlement agreements are to be encouraged
because they promote the amicable resolution of disputes and lighten the increasing load of litigation faced by the federal courts.”); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1072, 1075
(11th Cir. 2005) (“The general policy of the law is to favor the settlement of litigation, and the
policy extends to the settlement of patent infringement suits. . . . There is no question that settlements provide a number of private and social benefits as opposed to the inveterate and costly effects of litigation.”); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2005)
(citing the “longstanding” principle that “‘courts are bound to encourage’ the settlement of litigation”), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
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portant goal, it should not override the public policy objective of litigating
patent challenges to “protect consumers from unjustified monopolies” or
the maintenance of needlessly artificial anti-competitive drug prices. 229
The fact that one test would result in more settlements is insufficient to
establish its cost-effective merits over the test that results in more litigation.
This is because the pro-settlement test would, more often than not, result in
an unnecessarily higher cost to consumers through inflated drug prices that
come about as the result of brand-name manufacturers attempting to recoup
their payment losses following pay-for-delay arrangements. 230 The reality
is many reverse payment settlements are collusive, horizontal restraints on
trade, 231 and judicial preference for settlement should not be the deciding
factor in the debate about pay-for-delay standards. The quick look rule of
reason analysis takes into account the common sense understanding that an
agreement wherein one company pays another company to delay entry into
a particular market is a strong indication of anti-competitive intent. The
test, however, still provides manufacturers with the opportunity to defend
themselves and ensures that settlement will remain the prevalent form of
resolution in cases where delay is negotiated without compensation. 232
C. The Court Should Have Recommended That Judicial Settlement
Approval Be Required in Future Reverse Payment Cases
While the quick look rule of reason analysis would provide the appropriate level of scrutiny for reverse payment settlements, using this standard
to analyze settlements that have already occurred does not necessarily address the ubiquity of such agreements, which have significant financial implications for consumers. 233 Even if pre-existing reverse payment settlements are eventually challenged in court and deemed unlawful, the damage
will have already been done. Consumers will have had the excessive costs
of settlement agreements pushed onto them in the form of higher prices and
will have experienced delayed access to cheaper generic versions of their

229. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217.
230. PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 77, at 8, 10; see also C. Scott Hemphill, Paying-for-Delay:
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553,
1594 (2006) (“Saved litigation expense is thought to offset the allocative harm from the [reverse
payment] settlement. But although litigation expense is large in absolute terms, perhaps tens of
millions of dollars, its size is dwarfed by the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars reallocated
when parties enter a pay-for-delay settlement.”).
231. See Hemphill, supra note 230, at 1572 (“The FTC’s concern [with pay-for-delay] is
straightforward. Privately optimal agreements that impose large negative effects upon nonparties
frequently raise antitrust concerns.”); see supra Parts II.B.1–3.
232. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217.
233. See Hemphill, supra note 230, at 1594 (noting that pay-for-delay results in consumers
paying hundreds of millions of dollars in “reallocated” costs).
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medications, costing the public even more. 234 The goal, therefore, should
be to curb these settlements by discincentivizing generic companies from
settling when they know their patent does not infringe. Additionally, brandnames should be disincentivized from challenging generics’ patents when
they knowingly hold a weak patent or know that their sought-after patent
will not be infringed. The most effective means of accomplishing this task
lies in judicial approval of settlement amounts.
Judicial settlement approval is a controversial solution that typically
appears only in class action or Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) litigation contexts. 235 Generally, courts favor settlement approval requirements
in situations where parties are of unequal size or have vastly different levels
of sophistication as a way to prevent knowledgeable parties from taking advantage of those that are ignorant. 236 The situation in Actavis and other
pay-for-delay cases is of course different from employment lawsuits—
generic and brand-name drug manufacturers are not of significantly different means and posture, and both parties are aware of the consequences if a
brand-name’s challenge to a generic’s ANDA goes to trial. Yet, it is perhaps this awareness that makes judicial approval of settlement so necessary.
Because a generic manufacturer is cognizant of what its adversary stands to
lose, it is encouraged to engage in risk-seeking behavior by filing an ANDA
and is incentivized to settle if the offered price is on par with or higher than
what the generic would gain upon market entry. 237 Additionally, because
the first generic manufacturer to file an ANDA receives 180 days of exclusivity under Hatch-Waxman, generics manufacturers are induced to speed
up their testing processes and file abbreviated applications, even when they
are not entirely certain that their ANDA patents would not infringe. 238 This
period of exclusivity and a successful challenge of a major drug patent can

234. See supra Parts I & II.A (explaining that the primary negative consequence of pay-fordelay arrangements is that, in addition to consumers losing access to significantly cheaper medicines for longer periods of time, to recoup the losses from their hefty settlement payouts, brandname drug manufacturers push their expenditures onto consumers in the form of higher drug prices).
235. See, e.g., Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1982)
(holding that judicial settlement approval is necessary for lawful settlement of FLSA claims
brought by then-current employees); Pollar v. Judson Steel Corp., No. C-82-6833-MHP, 1984 WL
968 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 1984) (holding that defendant in a class action suit was prohibited from
proceeding with its settlement plan until further order of the court and court approval).
236. See, e.g., Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 709–10 (1945) (expressing the
importance of ensuring that the deterrent effect of a particular FLSA provision did not allow corrupt employers to take advantage of an employee by settling FLSA claims privately for a paltry
amount).
237. Hemphill, supra note 230, at 1579.
238. Id. at 1578–79.
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provide generics with a “valuable bounty” of several hundred million dollars. 239
Conversely, the pay-for-delay framework encourages brand-name
manufacturers to be inherently risk-averse. They stand to lose their monopoly on the market share of a particular drug if a generic prevails in its
ANDA application. It is therefore much more advantageous for them to
settle patent litigation—including payment for a generic’s delayed entry into the market—even if it comes at a high price. 240 For instance, in their article quantifying the litigation risk calculations of both brand-name and generic drug manufacturers, Xiang Yu and Anjan Chatterji show that making
reverse payment is a rational decision for a risk-averse brand-name manufacturer when there is high probability that a court will find its patent invalid during paragraph IV litigation, which would result in loss of its drug
monopoly. 241 When the amount that a brand-name would lose is greater
than the value of its projected litigation costs less the damages it could be
awarded if the brand-name’s predictions are wrong and a court finds its patent valid, there is an ostensible logical basis for a brand-name’s incentive
to settle, even at a high cost. 242 Judges and juries are fallible, however, and
neither brand-names nor generics can always accurately predict their findings about patent validity over the course of litigation; thus, even when a
brand-name is confident in its patent’s validity, it is willing to make reverse
payment offers to secure patent monopolies because of their lucrative potential. 243 The uncertainty of litigation outcomes thereby encourages brandname companies to settle as long as there is even the slightest chance of losing the patent at trial.244
The brand-name manufacturer, secure in its patent monopoly, is often
unable to feel the monetary loss resulting from its reverse payments because
it can recoup its settlement payout by charging consumers higher prices for
medicines. 245 The FTC estimates that reverse payment settlements cost
239. See, e.g., Comment of Apotex Corp. in Support of Citizen Petition Docket No. 2004p0075/CP1, to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., FDA 4 (Mar. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/apr04/040204/04P-0075-emc00001.pdf (discussing
generic manufacturer Apotex’s reported earnings of between $150 million and $200 million from
the exclusivity period of its generic version of Paxil, an antidepressant).
240. Xiang Yu & Anjan Chatterji, Why Brand Pharmaceutical Companies Choose to Pay Generics in Settling Patent Disputes: A Systematic Evaluation of the Asymmetric Risks in Litigation,
10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 19, 29 (2011).
241. Id. at 29–30.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 29.
244. Id.; Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 283, 301 (2012).
245. Cook, supra note 122, at 428; Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 244, at 301–03; Hemphill,
supra note 230, at 1582.
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consumers $3.5 billion annually, a figure that reflects both the costs pushed
on consumers by brand-names trying to earn back settlement payments, and
the higher prices that consumers pay for medicines because of delayed access to generic products. 246
In contrast, a generic is only incentivized to continue in litigating its
patent challenge when the brand-name is willing to pay significantly less
than the generic would receive in profits after its drug enters the market. 247
Even when the generic is confident in its challenge and the noninfringement of its ANDA, a brand-name’s high settlement offer is a definite win, as opposed to the mere prospect of profit from marketability that
comes with continued litigation.248 Therefore, as antitrust scholar C. Scott
Hemphill has noted, 249 pay-for-delay arrangements are logical for both
brand-name and generic manufacturers involved in paragraph IV litigation
when the monetary incentive to settle is significantly greater than the
amount that each thinks it would gain if litigation proceeded. 250 Moreover,
pay-for-delay arrangements become even more likely because of the “wide
gap” that exists between a brand-name’s risk tolerance and a generic’s willingness to litigate, given the economic payoff for each party that results
from pay-for-delay. 251
In order to break out of the problematic and costly reverse payment
settlement framework, both brand-names and generics must be induced to
pursue litigation over settlement or enter settlement agreements that do not
involve excessive compensation for market delay. The most effective
mechanism for accomplishing this goal is through required judicial settlement approval, which would ensure that settlements exceeding litigation
costs would not be permitted. If a court finds that a brand-name has offered
an excessive payment to delay a generic’s entry into a particular market, the
court can bar the settlement, which would compel the parties to renegotiate
their agreement. In turn, generics would likely be encouraged to proceed
with litigation when they are confident that their ANDA patent does not infringe because the potential gains resulting from ANDA approval would be
greater than the gains resulting from settlement. Finally, brand-names
would be discouraged from challenging generics’ ANDAs for patents that
the brand-name knows is weak or where the brand-name knows that the generic’s patent would not infringe. Brand-names would also be incentivized
to develop drugs and secure airtight, valid patents to minimize the risk of
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 77, at 2.
Yu & Chatterji, supra note 240, at 24.
Id.
Hemphill, supra note 230, at 1594.
Id. at 1591–92.
Yu & Chatterji, supra note 240, at 34.
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generic ANDA challenges alleging brand-name patent invalidity. Settlement approval would therefore continue to serve Hatch-Waxman’s goals of
maintaining drug development and innovation while keeping drug prices
low for consumers.
The mechanism of judicial settlement approval is directly in line with
legislative efforts to end the exorbitant pay-for-delay framework dating as
far back as 2002, after the U.S. Senate unanimously passed the Drug Competition Act of 2001. 252 The Drug Competition Act required all settlements
between generic and brand-name manufacturers involving agreements over
the “manufacture, marketing, or sale of the brand-name drug . . . [or] of the
generic drug” to be disclosed to the FTC or the U.S. Department of Justice. 253 More recently, however, members of Congress engaged in aggressive attempts to enact stringent legislation to curb the pay-for-delay phenomenon.
In the 109th, 110th, and 111th Congresses, Senator Herb Kohl of Wisconsin, along with several co-sponsors, supported the Preserve Access to
Affordable Generics Act, 254 which would make it illegal for any brandname and generic manufacturer to enter into an agreement where “(1) an
ANDA filer [generic manufacturer] receives anything of value; and (2) the
ANDA filer agrees not to research, develop, manufacture, market, or sell
the ANDA product for any period of time.” 255 Kohl’s version of the bill in
the 111th Congress was the only version to include two exceptions to the
harsh rule. First, any payments not exceeding $7.5 million, which are intended to reimburse the generic ANDA filer for “reasonable litigation expenses,” would be exempt from the bill.256 Second, the bill provided an opportunity for settling parties to rebut the presumption of the unlawful and
anti-competitive nature of their settlement.257 In the House of Representatives, Representative Henry Waxman—the very congressman for whom
Hatch-Waxman is partially named—introduced a bill in the 110th Congress
that would prohibit reverse payment settlements outright. 258 While none of
these bills have been passed, the unwavering legislative endeavors to address reverse payment settlements demonstrate that the ubiquity of such settlements is a serious problem that requires a preventative fix.

252. S. 754, 107th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, June 20, 2002).
253. Id. § 5(2)(2).
254. See S. 369, 111th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Feb. 3, 2009); S. 316, 110th Cong. (as
introduced in Senate, Jan. 17, 2007); S. 3582, 109th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, June 27,
2006).
255. See, e.g., S. 316, 110th Cong. § 3.
256. S. 369, 111th Cong. § 3.
257. Id.
258. H.R. 1432, 110th Cong. (as introduced by Rep. Waxman, Mar. 9, 2007).
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Of course, patent litigation is not inexpensive, either. In fact, because
it is particularly complex, it is also particularly costly: typically, a patent
case that proceeds to trial costs each side $1.5 million in legal fees alone.259
One study found that the total cost of litigation in an ANDA challenge is
approximately $10 million per suit.260 Therefore, if settlement approval led
to increased litigation, the litigation costs incurred by brand-name and generic manufacturers could be publicly reflected in the form of increased
drug prices in anticipation of litigation. Furthermore, although seemingly
counterintuitive, brand-names could potentially charge higher prices for
drugs as a—seemingly counterintuitive—means of recouping losses sustained upon generic market entry. 261 In a 2007 working paper for the
American Enterprise Institute-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, scholars Darius Lakdawalla, Tomas Philipson, and Richard Wang speculated that the increased costs and loss of market output that brand-names
would face if pay-for-delay were abolished would create a short-term consumer welfare loss of approximately $400,000 per month for each brandname drug facing generic entry. 262
Nevertheless, as discussed in Part IV.B.2, the cost of litigation is not
reason enough to forgo the policy of judicial settlement approval. Pay-fordelay creates an artificially inflated drug market wherein generic medications that should rightly be available to the public are delayed, forcing consumers to pay higher drug prices so that brand-name manufacturers can
make profits by engaging in collusive behavior. The fundamental problem
with the pay-for-delay arrangement is that it can represent an unnatural restraint on trade, which violates federal antitrust laws. Thus, this potentially
unlawful practice will only be curbed through a policy change that disincentivizes both generic and brand-name manufacturers from entering into reverse payment settlements in the first place.
V. CONCLUSION
In deciding FTC v. Actavis, the U.S. Supreme Court was presented
with a seminal opportunity to determine which of the competing standards
being applied to pay-for-delay settlement arrangements in the various fed259. Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlements of
Intellectual Property Disputes 6 n.18 (Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal
Theory, Research Paper No. 113, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstrat=380841.
260. Michael R. Herman, Note, The Stay Dilemma: Examining Brand and Generic Incentives
for Delaying the Resolution of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1788, 1795
n.41 (2011).
261. Yu & Chatterji, supra note 240, at 35; Darius Lakdawalla, Tomas Philipson & Richard
Wang, Intellectual Property and Marketing 20–24 (Reg. Markets Ctr., Working Paper No. 07-20,
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1089045.
262. Lakdawalla, Philipson & Wang, supra note 261, at 2–3.
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eral courts was the correct approach.263 While the Court rightly held that
antitrust laws are indeed applicable to pay-for-delay arrangements, 264 the
Court’s avoidance of the issue at the crux of the case—that is, which standard should ultimately be used in adjudicating pay-for-delay settlement provisions—did not adequately address the fundamental problem of pay-fordelay that plagues federal courts, the FTC, and purchasers of pharmaceuticals alleging antitrust injury. 265 The Court should have annunciated the
Third Circuit’s quick look rule of reason analysis as the standard for courts
to use in the future, as this test most effectively balances the need for antitrust scrutiny of settlements appearing to be prima facie restraints on trade,
with the need to continue encouraging both generic and brand-name drug
manufacturers to develop new medicines.266 Finally, the Court should have
recommended, as a policy consideration, that judicial settlement approval
be required for reverse payment settlement litigation going forward.267 This
policy would serve to disincentivize generics and brand-names from entering into exorbitant settlements that vastly exceed litigation costs, encourage
generics to pursue ANDA litigation when they know a brand-name’s patent
is weak or theirs would not infringe, and encourage brand-names to fight
for their right to a patent when they know that infringement would be imminent with the generic’s ANDA approval.

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See supra Part I.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.C.

